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Managing Editor:
Velibor Lalić
Editorial Board:
Darko Paspalj (Faculty of Security Studies, University of Banja Luka, Republika Srpska - BiH), 
Mile Šikman (Ministry of the Interior of the Republika Srpska - BiH ), Milan Lipovac (Faculty of 
Security, University of Belgrade, Serbia), Zana Vrućinić (Faculty of Security Studies,  
University of Banja Luka, Republika Srpska - BiH)
Dane Subošić (University of Criminal Investigation and Police Studies, Belgrade, Serbia); Goran 
Bošković (University of Criminal Investigation and Police Studies, Belgrade, Serbia); Saša 
Mijalković (University of Criminal Investigation and Police Studies, Belgrade, Serbia); Jasmina 
Gačić (Faculty of Security, University of Belgrade, Serbia); Božidar Banović (Faculty of Security, 
University of Belgrade, Serbia); Nenad Putnik (Faculty of Security, University of Belgrade; 
Milan Gujvica (Faculty of Security Studies, University of Banja Luka, Republika Srpska - BiH); 
Laurence Armand French (University of New Hampshire, USA); Želimir Kešetović (Faculty of 
Security, University of Belgrade, Serbia); Sreten Jugović (University of Criminal Investigation 
and Police Studies, Belgrade, Serbia); Stevo Jaćimovski (University of Criminal Investigation 
and Police Studies, Belgrade, Serbia)
The Journal Secretariat: Dragana Vasiljević, Milica Sikimić
Serbian Proofreader: Slobodanka Vidović
Translator: Lidija Nikolić Novaković
Print: Grafomark d.o.o Laktaši
Circulation: 100 copies
The journal is published twice a year
The Journal of Security and Criminal Sciences (is registered in the Register of Public Media of 
the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republika Srpska under number 688)
Council of the Journal:
ISSN 2637-3076
JO
U
RN
AL
 O
F 
SE
CU
RI
TY
 A
N
D 
CR
IM
IN
AL
 S
CI
EN
CE
S 
• 
Vo
l. 
1,
 N
o.
 1
 (2
01
9)
39
UNIVERSITY OF BANJA LUKA  - FACULTY OF SECURITY STUDIES
ON QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
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Abstract: In the late twentieth century, human race entered the era of 
information technology (IT). The IT industry, which deals with the production, 
processing, storage and transmission of information, has become an integral 
part of the global economic system, a completely independent and significant 
sector of the economy. The dependence of the modern society on information 
technologies is so great that omissions in information systems may lead to 
significant incidents. Telecommunications are the key information technology 
industry. However, information is very susceptible to various types of abuse 
during transmission. The units for data storage and processing can be 
physically protected from anyone wishing harm, but this does not hold true 
for the communication lines that span hundreds or thousands of kilometers 
and are virtually impossible to protect. Therefore, the problem of information 
protection in the field of telecommunications is highly significant. Cryptology, 
particularly cryptography, deals with this issue. Quantum cryptography is a 
relatively new field ensuring safe communication between the sender and the 
recipient using the laws of quantum physics. This paper seeks to address the 
principles of the quantum distribution of a key for information encryption and 
the fundamental problems arising from the execution.
Keywords: cryptography, algorithms, encryption, key, quantum physics, 
protocols
INTRODUCTION
According to Anglo-Saxon tradition, the participants in the process of 
encryption and decryption are called Alice and Bob. An enemy, who wishes 
to disclose unauthorized information shared by Alice and Bob, is called Eva 
1 Stevo Jaćimovski: Full Professor, University of Criminal Investigation and Police Studies, Belgrade, 
Serbia, Belgrade. E-mail: stevo.jacimovski@kpu.edu.rs
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which is derived from eavesdropper (Bennett, 1992). The enemy, it is assumed, 
has unlimited computer resources and is familiar with the use of cryptographic 
methods, algorithms2, protocols3, and so on (Dugić, 2009).
The primary task of cryptography is to transform an initial text (plaintext) 
into an arbitrary string of characters called a cryptogram. The number of 
characters in the plaintext and the cryptogram may differ. The secrecy of the 
encryption algorithm itself cannot, in principle, ensure the unconditional 
security of the cryptograms, as it is assumed that Eva (the enemy) has infinitely 
large computer resources. Therefore, public key algorithms are used nowadays. 
The security of modern cryptosystems is based on the secrecy of a small item 
of information called a key, rather than on the secrecy of an algorithm. The key 
is used to manage the encryption process and should be easily changeable at 
any time. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Dutch scientist Kirchhoff 
formulated a rule by which the security of a key is ensured if the entire 
encryption system, other than the secret key, that is, the information that 
manages the process of cryptographic transformation, becomes known to the 
enemy, (Kilin, Horosko & Nizovcev, 2007).
SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION SYSTEM
Figure 1. Structure of symmetric cryptosystems4
In symmetric cryptosystems, the sender and the recipient use the same 
secret key (Figure 1). An item of information is also encrypted and decrypted 
with this secret key. The key must be periodically updated and distributed at 
the same time to both the sender and the recipient. The process of distributing 
secret keys among the regular participants in the information exchange is a 
very complex process. If an illegitimate user (Eve) had the secret key, it would 
2 An algorithm is a set of commands, instructions, actions, calculations executed in order to achieve 
a result of initial data.
3 A protocol is a set of actions (instructions, commands, calculations, algorithms) executed in a 
particular order by two or more actors with the aim of achieving a result.
4 Translator’s note: Alice – link channel– Bob; secret key; key generator.
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enable the knowledge of the information exchanged between Alice and Bob 
(Румянцев, Голубчиков 2009).
Symmetric cryptographic algorithms provide a high level of protection, 
as long as the key is only known to the sender and the recipient of the message. 
Therefore, the basic measure of the security of symmetric algorithms is the 
method of key distribution. The well-known and most widespread symmetric 
algorithm is DES and an improved version of 3 DES (Čisar, 2015).
This problem has previously been solved by a non-cryptographic method 
– by transferring the key to the physically protected eavesdropping channels. 
However, the creation of such a channel and its maintenance in operational 
readiness in case of an urgent need for a key transfer is very long and costly. 
Therefore, in the conditions of a constant increase in the intensity of information 
flows, this key distribution method has become less acceptable and satisfactory.
The problem has been successfully solved within modern cryptography. 
There are two ways to solve the key distribution: mathematically and physically. 
The mathematical method is realized by using a two-key based protocol or 
public-key cryptography. The physical way is realized by means of quantum 
cryptography.
ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION METHOD
Figure 2. Structure of asymmetric cryptosystems5
Asymmetric cryptosystems use two keys – Figure 2. The first key is 
public and is available to all users of the information exchange. Information 
is encrypted with this key. Only the recipient (Bob) has the second secret key. 
Decrypting information with the public key is impossible. Also, the decryption 
key cannot be determined by using public key encryption (Румянцев & Голуб-
чиков, 2009).
5 Translator’s note: Alice – link channel – Bob; public key – key exchange center – secret key.
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In 1976, the scheme of asymmetric cryptography was proposed by Diffie 
and Hellman, Stanford University. If Alice and Bob want to establish a secret 
key, it is enough to follow this protocol (Jakus, 2016):
• Alice generates a random number A, computes P=e A  and sends P to Bob
• Bob generates a random number B, computes Q=eB and sends Q to Alice.
Then Alice and Bob compute the secret key, K, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Diffie–Hellman protocol
Suppose Eva has P and Q. Can she compute K? To compute K, Eva must 
compute A or B because she can then repeat the computation of the key in the 
same way as Alice or Bob can. The idea is that the calculation A or B requires 
computing the discrete logarithm:
 A=lnP,  B=lnQ
for which there is no effective way (Stipčević, 2007). The security of the 
Diffie–Hellman method is based on the complexity of the discrete logarithm. 
The most famous algorithm within the group of asymmetric cryptographic 
methods is the RSA.
In the first case, different keys are encrypted and decrypted in the two-
key based protocol, so there is no need to keep the secret key secure. However, 
due to the extremely low performance characteristics and exposure to the 
special types of attacks, such ciphers have proved inappropriate to close direct 
user information. Instead, asymmetric ciphers are used as part of combined 
schemes, when a string of data is encrypted with a symmetric cipher on a one-
time key, which is encrypted with a two-key cipher and is transmitted in this 
form along with the data.
In the second case, in public-key cryptography, the schemes for the 
distribution of the key over open communications channels solve the same 
problem in a slightly different way: during an interaction, two participants 
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exchanging information generate a shared secret key, which is then used to 
encrypt the data being transferred using a symmetric cipher. Furthermore, 
intercepting information in a channel during a generating session of such a key 
does not allow the enemy to obtain the key by himself or herself.
The security of two-key cryptosystems is based on a slow technical 
progress. Their security is based on the problem of factorizing large numbers 
and computing discrete logarithms in certain final groups. These problems are 
believed to be “tough” in the sense that they might be solved by guessing all 
possible solutions (keys), with a number of steps increasing exponentially with 
the key length.
Secrecy in the modern world is based on the idea that something is 
computer-secure, in other words, it is secure in the sense that it would take too 
much computer time and power to break the cipher (Vedral, 2014). Finding a 
factor for large numbers is a difficult problem. Let us imagine the number 100. 
What are its factors? Two times 50 equals 100. But this is also true for 4 times 25, 
or 5 times 20 or 10 times 10. The number of factors grows rapidly and finding all 
of them poses a significant difficulty to every modern classical computer.
Nevertheless, with the expected emergence of quantum computers 
for which rapid factoring algorithms have been developed, the cryptographic 
systems based on the mathematical cryptographic methods can be compromised.
The procedure for this was developed by Peter Shore (Shor, 1994) 
who created an algorithm according to which a quantum computer can exist 
simultaneously in many different states, as it uses the quantum superposition 
principle. Let us imagine a single computer in a superposition, which is 
simultaneously at different locations. In each of these locations, we can 
configure a computer to share our number with another number to search for 
factors. In this way, we get an extremely rapid acceleration of the solution to the 
factorization problem, given that one quantum computer now simultaneously 
performs all these divisions, one at each spatial location. According to experts, 
a quantum computer that can break the RSA crypto system will be designed in 
about 15-25 years.
It is precisely for this reason that the idea of protecting information 
must be sought in, colloquially speaking, “hardware”, that is, by using the laws 
of quantum mechanics for protection.
Therefore, the need to protect cryptosystems has arisen for other reasons. 
The solution of key distribution is realized in quantum cryptography based on 
the laws of physics (Jaćimovski & Šetrajčić, 2016).
The basic arguments for this are twofold:
• It is impossible to copy an unknown quantum state
• Without perturbation, it is impossible to have information about 
non-orthogonal quantum states (in other words, when accessing 
an information channel, Eva changes the status of the information 
holders)
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Quantum cryptography uses the uncertainty of the quantum world 
during the measuring process, the so-called Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle 
(Heisenberg, 1974). With quantum physics, a communication channel which 
cannot be eavesdropped without interfering with the transmission can be 
established. Two users who communicate with each other can always detect the 
presence of the third party trying to discover the key.
Also, an eavesdropper cannot copy unknown quantum bits, the so-called 
qubits, that is, unknown quantum states, because of the no-cloning theorem. 
Quantum cryptography is only used to generate and distribute a key, rather than 
to transmit messages. The generated key can thus be used in a cryptosystem for 
encryption and decryption.
In this way, quantum cryptography allows for relatively fast key exchange 
and the detection of Eve’s attempts to enter the link channel. Note that the 
occurrence of errors during the transmission and reception of quantum states 
does not necessarily lead to the loss of secrecy. A critical error is defined for 
each protocol of quantum cryptography, above which secrecy is not ensured. If 
the error level (usually expressed in terms of percentages) is below the critical 
level, then the error correction protocols and the subsequent compression of 
the remaining bits are used to create the key. Following these procedures, Eva 
has as much information about the key as Alice and Bob want her to have (Picek 
& Golub, 2009).
Presently, three forms of quantum state encryption are used in quantum 
cryptography: polarization encoding, phase enciphering and encoding using 
time shifts. This paper demonstrates the procedure for the polarization 
encoding of quantum states, the so-called BB84 protocol, and elaborates the 
E91protocol. Other protocols of quantum cryptography are also used.
Example of the BB84 protocol without noise
The BB84 protocol (Bennett & Brassard, 1984) is the historical first 
protocol for quantum key distribution (Kilin, Khoroshko & Nizovtsev, 2007), 
whose security is based on the principles of quantum mechanics, making it 
absolutely safe if there is no noise in the quantum channel. The absence of 
noise in a given situation assumes that the quantum state of particles does not 
change along the quantum channel.
The BB84 protocol is formulated in the language of individual photons, 
(Figure 4), although it can be applied to other realizations of a qubit. To 
encode information, four polarization states forming two interconnected non-
orthogonal bases are used in the protocol: rectangular ↔ and diagonal 
 ( ) / 2= ↔ + 
            
 ( ) / 2= ↔ − 
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Figure 4. The BB48 protocol demonstration
The essence of the BB84 protocol is that one of the users (Alice) randomly 
selects a series of bits (stage 1) and a series of bases (stage 2) and then sends a 
user (Bob) a string of photons (stage 3) each of which encodes one bit from the 
selected string in the base corresponding to the prime number of that bit, where 
the states ↔    are encoded into (0) zero, and the states     into one (1). In 
obtaining a photon, Bob randomly selects the measurement base (rectangular 
or diagonal) for each photon and independently of Alice, (stage 4), analogously 
interprets the result of his measurement for each photon in two ways, as a zero or 
one (stage 5). In accordance with the laws of quantum mechanics and following 
the measuring of the diagonal photon in a rectangular base, its polarization 
turns into the horizontal or vertical line and vice versa, with random results. In 
this way, Bob obtains the results coinciding with the state of the photons sent 
in about half the cases (50%), that is, when he correctly hits the base.
The next stage of the protocol is realized via a public channel, through 
which Alice and Bob can openly convey classical information to each other. 
At this stage, we assume that Eva can listen to the announcements by both 
parties, but she cannot change them or send notifications instead of them. 
To begin with, Alice and Bob determine (via a public channel) which photons 
were successfully obtained by Bob and which of them were measured in the 
correct base (stages 6 and 7). After that, Alice and Bob have the same bit values 
encoded in these photons, regardless of the fact that this information has never 
been established in the open communication channel (stage 8). In other words, 
each of these photons carries a bit of random information, which is known only 
to Alice and Bob and no one else. Information about the photons measured in 
the wrong base is rejected, so Alice and Bob get the so-called sieved key, which, 
in the event that Eva did not intercept the information, should be the same for 
both parties.
Quantum channel – sending polarized photons
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Table 1. Example of the realization of the BB84 protocol. States     encrypt (0) 
zero, while states     encrypt one (1). Rectangular and diagonal bases 
are indicated by ⊗  and by ⊗ .
Stage 1 Random bit transmission 
(Alice)
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
Stage 2 Random bit transmission 
(Alice)
⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊕ ⊕ ⊗ ⊗ ⊕
Stage 3 Polarization of photons 
distributed along the 
quantum channel
↔ ↕ ↔
Stage 4 Randomly received bases  
(Bob)
⊕ ⊕ ⊗ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
Stage 5 Bits received by Bob 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
Stage 6 Bob informs Alice about 
the bases of reception
⊕ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
Stage 7 Аlice tells Bob which of 
their bases are harmonized
Stage 8 Sieved key 1 1 0
Stage 9 Bob discovers a portion of 
bits
1
Stage 10 Alice confirms it
Stage 11 Sieved key after error 
assessment
1 0
Suppose Eva is eavesdropping on a quantum channel. Due to the random 
selection of a rectangular or diagonal base, Eva influences the information in 
such a way that it changes the bits of the sieved key, which would have to be 
the same for Alice and Bob if there was no Eve. No measurement of the photons 
performed by Eve gives more than one half of the bit information encrypted 
by this photon; any such measurement gives b bits of information (b <1/2) 
and is not in compliance with the probability which is ultimately equal to b/2 
if the measured photon or its replacement is measured in the initial base by 
Bob.  Alice and Bob can check if someone is eavesdropping on them by openly 
comparing a portion of bits (stages 9 and 10) for which they must have the 
same information, although these bits cannot, any longer, be used for the secret 
key. The position of the bits being compared should be a random subset of 
the properly measured bits so that the presence of Eve must be noticed. If all 
the bits compared match, it is clear that there was no eavesdropping, and the 
remaining bits properly measured can be used for the secret key encryption 
(stage 11) and transmission over the open channel.
Once this key is used, Alice and Bob repeat the procedure to create a new 
secret key.
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The security of the BB84 protocol
The BB84 protocol would be threatened if Eve is able to perform the 
following interventions on the quantum channel (Markagić, 2012):
1. To measure the polarization of the photon sent by Alice, reproduce 
the same one and send it to Bob
2. To reproduce the photons sent by Alice
In the first case, Eva would have the same information that Alice and Bob 
had, so at the end of the procedure they would have the same key. However, Alice 
uses photons from the conjugated bases, in other words, there is no orientation 
of a polarizer with which Eva could with certainty distinguish the polarization of 
photons. In the second case, Eva wants to assure the polarization of the photons 
with a number of differently oriented polarizers. However, the reproduction of 
an unknown quantum state is not possible due to the no-cloning theorem.
In the communication process between Alice and Bob, a portion of the 
photons accurately measured is likely to be detected incorrectly. Also, if Eva 
attempts to measure the photons sent by Alice before they reach Bob, errors 
are likely to occur due to the fact that Eva is attempting to measure the data 
pertaining to the polarization of photons. These two situations cannot be 
distinguished:  natural or artificial sounds look the same. As a result, Alice and 
Bob agree on a smaller cryptographic key in three phases viz. error assessment, 
information leverage and privacy enhancement.
The Е91 protocol (Ekert, 1991) 
Further, the improvement of cryptosystem reliability can be achieved 
using the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) effect (Einstein, Podolsky & Rosen, 
1935). The EPR effect occurs when a spherical symmetric atom radiates two 
photons in opposite directions to two observers. The photons are emitted with 
an unspecified polarization, but due to the symmetry of their polarization, they 
are always opposite (the quantum interference effect). An important feature 
of this effect is that the polarization of photons becomes known only after 
having been measured. Based on the EPR, Ekert proposed a crypto-scheme 
guaranteeing the security of the key transfer and storage. The sender generates 
a number of the APR photon pairs and leaves one photon from each pair 
for himself or herself, and sends the other one to his or her partner. At the 
same time, if the registration efficiency is close to the unity, when the sender 
receives the value of polarization 1, his or her partner will register the value 
0 and vice versa. Clearly, in this way, partners, whenever necessary, can get 
identical pseudo-random code sequences. Practically, the implementation of 
this scheme is problematic due to the low efficiency of recording and measuring 
the polarization of one photon.
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CONCLUSION
The task of cryptography is the exchange of secret messages. There are 
traditional methods that practically guarantee a secure communication (between 
Alice and Bob) if the secret decryption key is known to both parties, and at the same 
time, the key is not known to anyone else, even the potential enemy Eve.
It is this presumption of the secrecy of the “secret key” that is the 
weakest link in classical cryptography. The only task of quantum cryptography 
is to ensure a secret key. Thus, in quantum cryptography, not only messages 
are exchanged via the so-called quantum channel, but also secret keys. Today, 
there are already commercial devices as well as dozens of implementations 
of public and corporate secure network communications using the quantum 
key distribution technologies. The advantage of these technologies is the 
unconditional security based on the phenomena of quantum mechanics. Today, 
it is almost possible, with the unconditional security, to generate and distribute 
a secret key between two parties connected by optical fibers at distances up to 
150 kilometers in a few seconds. Eavesdropping on communications by a third 
party does not lead to the revealing of a secret, but only to the reduction of the 
speed of key generation, with both parties immediately knowing that the line 
is being actively eavesdropped. The main disadvantage of these systems is the 
limited key generation speed, which depends directly on the distance of the 
participants, the inability to increase the signal or transmission through a type 
of relay, practical limitations solely on fiber optic communications, as well as 
the cost of system implementation (Ijačić, 2014).
In ideal systems of quantum communication, the interception of data 
is impossible, as the participants in the exchange of information immediately 
identify the interception as errors occurring in the transmission. However, the 
actual systems are different from the ideal ones.
Unlike the ideal quantum communication system, the actual quantum 
communication systems are unable to ensure the absolute secrecy of the data 
transmitted, due to the fact that there is a fond of its own errors in the system, 
behind which the attempts to intercept information can be hidden, as well 
as the attenuation of communication channels due to the necessity of using 
multiphoton pulses. The use of strong photon pulses leads to the dampening of 
the transmission of information enabling the interception of silent data. This 
is a factor that cannot practically be removed, as the quality of the channel 
through which the information is transmitted cannot always be controlled.
However, before the quantum communication systems is applied 
in practice, a number of technical difficulties need to be solved, such as the 
development of stable sources of single photons and single-photon detectors 
that would operate in a normal temperature range and should not be cooled by 
liquid gases. Different correction codes should be used to fight system errors, 
while the procedures for increasing security should be used to reduce the 
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importance of intercepted bits. Additionally, extra security measures of purely 
technical nature may be undertaken. 
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